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I. INTRODUCTION: THE POLICY RATIONALE
FOR A CHILD SUPPORT DEDUCTION
Bobby Brown, the once famous R&B singer, is the new symbol of
the deadbeat dad, having been arrested several times for failing to pay
child support. 1 Could the tax system be used to help fathers like Brown
meet their obligations? Would this be a wise redistribution of public
assets? Would this be helpful to children? This Article addresses these
questions.
Children are our future, literally. We profess this sentiment in our
songs, 2 evidencing, among other things, its universality in our collective
consciousness. “The duty of parents to provide shelter and sustenance to
their dependents . . . [is one of the] most fundamental and necessitous
known to society, both animal and human.” 3 The evidence suggests that
we are falling short on our obligations to children. While the United
States spends $8 billion per month fighting which many deem an
unpopular war in Iraq, 4 tardy child support payments also tally in the
1. See Judge Orders Bobby Brown Arrested, USA TODAY, Oct. 2, 2006,
http://www.usatoday.com/life/people/2006-10-02-bobby-brown-arrest-warrant_x.htm
[hereinafter Brown Arrested].
2. See DANNY ADLERMAN & KIM ADLERMAN, SONGS FOR AMERICA’S CHILDREN
(2002).
3. CAROLE A. CHAMBERS, CHILD SUPPORT: HOW TO GET WHAT YOUR CHILD
NEEDS AND DESERVES 11 (1991) (quoting Justice Richard J. Huttner, New York State
Supreme Court) [hereinafter CAROLE CHAMBERS]. As the title of the book suggests,
this is a self-help book for the custodial parent looking to get child support from the
non-custodial parent. The book has some very good suggestions for the custodial
parent, such as reminders that she is to put her feelings aside and focus on her children’s
needs. However, some of the recommendations, such as when determining how much
your child needs “this is not the time to underestimate expenses,” can be misinterpreted.
See id. at 20-21; see also Martha Minow, How Should We Think About Child Support
Obligations?, in FATHERS UNDER FIRE: THE REVOLUTION IN CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT 302, 305 (Garfinkel et al. eds., 1998). Minow summarizes the duty of
parents by quoting William Blackstone:
The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children, is a principle of
natural law; an obligation . . . laid on them not only by nature herself but by their own
proper act, in bringing them into the world; for they would be in the highest manner
injurious to their issue; if they only gave their children life that they might afterwards
see them perish.

Id.
4. See Andrew Taylor, Senate Approves $70 Billion For War Spending, S.F.
CHRON., Sept. 29, 2006, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/n/
a/2006/09/29/national/w074740d20.dtl.
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billions. 5 Failure to pay child support, called the largest single crime in
America, 6 and noted as one of the most pervasive acts of civil
disobedience since prohibition and the anti-drug laws, persists. 7 An
estimated 75% to 87% of children in single parent households receive no
financial support from their non-custodial parent. 8 The scope of the
problem is elucidated by the shocking fact that half of our nation’s
children, at some point in the next decade, will be eligible to receive
child support. 9
The United States is facing a real crisis regarding child support. To
borrow an analogy from U.S. Sen. Barack Obama, although this may be
a “quiet” crisis, 10 it is nevertheless real and painful to millions of
women, children, and men. Public action started in earnest in the 1980s
when the federal government began to crack down on parents who do
not make their mandated payments. 11 Congress encouraged similar
5. CAROLE CHAMBERS, supra note 3, at 17 (claiming an arrearage of $4 billion
annually as of 1984).
6. Id.
7. See William S. Comanor, Child Support Payments: A Review of Current
Policies, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS 1, 2 (William S.
Comanor ed., 2004) [hereinafter Comanor, Review of Current Policies].
8. CAROLE CHAMBERS, supra note 3, at 17.
9. See IRWIN GARFINKEL, ASSURING CHILD SUPPORT—AN EXTENSION OF SOCIAL
SECURITY 18 (1992) [hereinafter GARFINKEL, ASSURING CHILD SUPPORT]. According to
the author, the current divorce rates and the growing rate of out of wedlock births
support this claim. Another commentator notes that with one out of every four children
being born out of wedlock, the problem is only getting worse. The commentator
provides some sobering statistics, such as 25% of custodial parents who were not
married at the time of their children’s birth obtained child support orders and 75% of
custodial parents who were married to non-custodial parents at the time of their
children’s births received child support orders. See SIMONE SPENCE, DEADBEATS: WHAT
RESPONSIBLE PARENTS NEED TO KNOW 15 (2001).
10. Cf. Roland S. Martin, Obama’s “Quiet Riots” Are For Real, June 11, 2007,
http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/06/07/martin/index.html (discussing Sen. Obama’s
speech regarding the “burning anger” among poor African-Americans in the United
States, and warning the Bush Administration that it is ignoring the “quiet riots” that are
occurring in these communities).
11. See MARCIA MOBILIA BOUMIL & JOEL FRIEDMAN, DEADBEAT DADS—A
NATIONAL CHILD SUPPORT SCANDAL 10 (1996). This marked a change from the handsoff approach of the 1950s to the moral outrage of the 1980s. See id. Other reasons for
this shift in attitude include the rise of the women’s movement and “the conservative
anti-welfare administrations of the 1980s.” Id. “The greatest influence, however, is the
reality that the ever increasing burden on state and federal social programs require[d] a
change in policy.” Id.
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crackdowns at the state level by threatening to reduce federal
subsidies. 12 This effort has extended to all segments of the population,
including some celebrities. 13 In one high profile case, the irresponsible
father went so far as to murder someone in order to shirk his fatherly
duties. 14
This Article does not eschew the term “deadbeat dad” in favor of
more politically correct nomenclature (e.g., “deadbeat parent”), because
the evidence still shows that the non-custodial parent of children
indebted with child support payments remains, in large part, the father of
the child. 15 Yet, there exists another side to the story. The reality of the
12. See id. As an incentive, the federal government pays for 66% of the states’
operating costs and 90% of all information technology and genetic testing expenses.
JOCELYN ELISE CROWLEY, THE POLITICS OF CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA 40 (2003).
The federal government has used such tactics in the past to coerce states to follow their
lead. Another example is the use of federal highway funds to coerce states to increase
the legal drinking age to 21.
13. See Brown Arrested, supra note 1. A famous deadbeat dad and poster child for
this group has been Bobby Brown. See id. The former R&B singer who was married to
Whitney Houston has seen his share of troubles for failing to pay child support. See id.
He has been threatened with incarceration and has even been incarcerated for failing to
pay child support. See id. Media reports of middle to high income fathers refusing to
pay their child support payments have created the stereotypical deadbeat dad. Cf. id.
Unwillingness to pay child support, however, is only one reason for non-payments. See
THEODORA OOMS & JENNIFER WEINREB, REDUCING FAMILY POVERTY AND CHILD TAXBASED STRATEGIES 11 (The Family Impact Seminar 1992). There are other reasons,
such as lack of income. See id. Nevertheless, claims that there is often no connection
between non-payment of child support and lack of income persist. See CAROLE
CHAMBERS, supra note 3, at 19.
14. See Dave Andrusko, Rae Carruth Convicted in Murder of Pregnant Girlfriend,
NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS, Feb. 2001, available at http://www.nrlc.org/news/2001/N
RL02/carruth.html. An extreme case of a deadbeat dad-to-be involves Rae Carruth, a
former professional football player. See id. Unable to convince his pregnant girlfriend
to have an abortion, Mr. Carruth conspired to have her killed, and succeeded. See id.
He is currently serving an 18-year sentence in a North Carolina prison. Id.
15. Cf. Frank J. Furstenberg, Jr., Dealing with Dads: The Changing Roles of
Fathers, in ESCAPE FROM POVERTY: WHAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE FOR CHILDREN 189,
196 (P. Lindsay Chase-Lansdale & Jeanne Brooks-Gunn eds., 1995). In most cases, the
mother is given custody of the children. Id. A 1989 survey shows that “close to 90% of
children from divorced families initially are in the custody of their mothers.” Id. After
two years, contact with their father drops off considerably. Id. A more recent survey in
1998 shows that fathers make up 18% of all single parents. Ronald K. Henry, Child
Support Policy and the Unintended Consequences of Good Intentions, in THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS 128, 138 (William S. Comanor ed., 2004).
Gender biases, however, are not easily erased and there is a continuing gender bias
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deadbeat dad might not be that repulsive. He has been described in
more human terms as a man trying to make the best of a bad situation, 16
as contemporary literature begins to debunk the myth of the deadbeat
dad. 17 Some have argued that the current legal system of child support
enforcement is responsible for creating the deadbeat dad. 18 The unique
American family law system at the state level often bifurcates the rights
and responsibilities of parents. 19 The custodial parent is assigned the
right of custody but often bears none of the financial responsibility to
support the children, as that responsibility is assigned to the noncustodial parent who is denied the right to participate in the lives of the
children. 20 Some experts in the field have advanced the above reasoning
as the cause for this large scale civil disobedience. 21
Clearly, some fathers deserve the “deadbeat dad” moniker. One
popular image is, for instance, those fathers who drive luxury cars while
their children starve. 22 This, however, is not the norm. The average
father is responsible and wants to do the right thing, but there are strong
forces against him, like the inability to pay. 23 Survey after survey shows
against fathers in custody determination. Id.
16. See infra notes 105-10.
17. See generally JOHN CONINE, FATHERS’ RIGHTS: THE SOURCEBOOK FOR
DEALING WITH THE CHILD SUPPORT SYSTEM (1989) (discussing how fathers are often
unjustly classified as deadbeat dads); EARL JOHNSON ET AL., FATHERS’ FAIR SHARE:
HELPING POOR MEN MANAGE CHILD SUPPORT AND FATHERHOOD (1999) (discussing
alternative methods of encouraging fathers to pay child support as opposed to the
traditional punitive enforcement methods which vilify deadbeat dads).
18. Henry, supra note 15, at 139. (arguing that government policy must be
examined as the culprit because “[w]e do not have a problem with large numbers of
parents who refuse to provide for their children during an intact marriage, yet those
same responsible parents become ‘deadbeats’ upon divorce”).
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. OOMS & WEINREB, supra note 13, at 9. Non-custodial fathers are seen as “a
homogeneous group, at least in terms of their ability to pay.” Irwin Garfinkel et al.,
Introduction to FATHERS UNDER FIRE 1, 6 (Garfinkel et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter
Garfinkel, Introduction]. “Hence the term ‘deadbeat dad’ is applied indiscriminately to
all nonpaying fathers” regardless of the reason for nonpayment. Garfinkel, Introduction,
supra, at 6. The truth, however, is that while some fathers have the ability to pay but
refuse, some fathers simply cannot afford to pay. See id.
23. See CROWLEY, supra note 12, at 162-63. This is the position that is being
advocated by fathers’ rights groups. They argue that the country’s “monomaniacal zeal
to catch and punish deadbeat dads has produced a child support enforcement system
inherently inequitable and unjust to fathers.” Id. at 162. The role of the father is, thus,
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that custodial mothers report that the reason for lack of payment from
the non-custodial father is that “he can’t pay.” 24 Nevertheless, the
authorities blindly continue to enforce child support payment debts and,
in some cases, enforce them by imprisonment; 25 in situations where the
mother receives public aid, federal and state governments will provide
the child support payment to the mother and hold the father indebted to
the government for that amount. 26 In cases where the mother is not
dependent on welfare, the government has largely stayed out of the
fray. 27
To deal with its new role as creditor, the federal government
created the Office of Child Support Enforcement (“OCSE”) to enforce
child support payments. By its own estimation, the OCSE has been
wildly successful. 28 Independent critics, however, demur, accusing the
office of cooking its books. 29 These claims will be analyzed later.
Clearly, though, the child support crisis remains a major sociological
problem and is intensifying as the number of single-parent households
rises. This Article proposes a solution—provide a positive financial
incentive to the non-custodial parent to make payments.
Psychologists tell us that to ensure success in modifying behavior, a
“carrot and stick approach” is needed. 30 In the child support arena, the
reduced to one dimension, that of an economic provider. Id. Over time, this weakens
the father-child bond. Id.
24. See Henry, supra note 15, at 155. A 1992 survey of the General Accountability
Office (GAO) shows that 66% of custodial mothers listed this as the reason they are not
getting support from their father’s child. See id. But see OOMS & WEINREB, supra note
13, at 11 (claiming smaller numbers).
25. See BOUMIL & FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 85.
26. See CROWLEY, supra note 12, at 39. Welfare mothers must assign their support
rights to the state, and any support that the state collects on their behalf from their
former partners goes back to the state. Id. at 42.
27. Id. With regard to welfare mothers, they are required by law to register in their
states’ child support programs. Id. Non-welfare mothers can take advantage of such
programs but do not have to. See id.
28. See Henry, supra note 15, at 128. According to its own data, the OCSE spent
$3 billion in 2000 and reported a cost effectiveness of $3.95, meaning that it recovered
$3.95 for every dollar it spent. Id.
29. Id. at 129.
30. Cf. Chennai M. Selvarajamani, What is the Meaning and Origin of “Carrot
and Stick Approach?,” THE HINDU, Sept. 16, 2003, http://www.hindu.com/br/2003/09/1
6/stories/2003091600250300.htm. The carrot and stick approach has been credited to
owners of donkeys who would dangle a carrot on the nose of the donkeys to keep them
moving. See id. If this strategy did not work, then the stick would be used to strike the
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government has used the “stick” approach for the past three decades,
with arguably little success. 31 It might be time to adopt a carrot
approach. The stick must be retained to address those who will only
respond to the coercive power of the state. For the vast majority,
positive incentives can be created to push them into the correct behavior.
One of the easiest and least costly ways of ensuring greater
discharge of child support obligations is to permit a tax deduction for the
payor. Coupled with an inclusion in the income of the payee parent, the
government would lose little tax revenue because: (1) the number of
women earning compensate wages to their male counterparts is rising,
thus, decreasing the tax distortion of a deduction/inclusion regime; and
(2) the number of men gaining custody of their children is also rising.
Moreover, tax revenue might increase, on balance, through a reduction
in administrative costs. 32
More importantly, because it has been recognized that there is a
direct correlation between payment of child support and participation in
a child’s life, 33 such an incentive has the added benefit of keeping or
reintroducing the father in the lives of his children. This would have
important sociological consequences, especially in the Latino and
African-American communities where participation of fathers in the
lives of their children has been reported to be much lower than that of
other communities. 34
animal. See id.
31. Cf. Irwin Garfinkel & Sara McLanahan, The Effects of Child Support Reform
on Child Well-Being, in ESCAPE FROM POVERTY: WHAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE FOR
CHILDREN 211, 222 (P. Lindsay Chase-Lansdale & Jeanne Brooks-Gunn eds., 1995)
(discussing the effects of numerical guidelines used to ascertain and preserve adequate
levels of child support). Between 1978 and 1985, “the average real value of child
support payments has decreased by 25%.” Id.
32. See Henry, supra note 15, at 128 (indicating that if child support payments are
voluntarily made, the need for the OCSE would be eliminated or greatly diminished,
potentially saving the government—federal and state—$4.5 billion that it is currently
spending on child support enforcement).
33. See BOUMIL & FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 17. “A parent who is able to
maintain a meaningful relationship with his children is simply more likely to keep up
with his financial obligations.” Id. at x.
34. See ROBERT JOSEPH TAYLOR ET AL., FAMILY LIFE IN BLACK AMERICA 15-17
(1997). According to statistics reported in the late 1990s, only 33.1% of black children
live with both parents as opposed to 75.9% of white children and 66.1% of Hispanic
children. Id. at 15. As a consequence, while only 16.2% of white children live in
poverty, 41.9% of all black children are poor. Id. at 17. Making matters worse, the
poverty of black children appears chronic. See id.
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Both tax and non-tax commentators have proposed variations on the
child support deduction theme. 35 Revenue-oriented schemes normally
concern the technicalities of the tax system, such as whether the Internal
Revenue Code (“IRC”) would permit this type of deduction—it is a
“personal deduction”—or whether the payee parent can receive a
deduction for non-payment of child support. 36 Non-tax commentators,
on the other hand, mostly analyze the sociological aspect of this debate
and address the economic and tax aspects of the debate only in passing.
This proposal bridges the gap by marrying the sociological aspects of
child support debate with the technicalities of the tax laws.
Additionally, this Article will argue the theoretical rationale justifying
such a deduction on policy grounds, 37 and will employ the traditional
process of evaluating good tax laws: whether it is equitable, efficient and
simple, essentially addressing whether the proposal is good tax law. 38
Part II outlines the history of the problem of non-payment of child
support and the evolution of remedial measures. Part III proposes a
series of related solutions to the problem, namely setting realistic child
support payments in conjunction with permitting a deduction for such
payments. Part IV discusses tax deductions in the context of the typical
35. See, e.g., Irwin Garfinkel et al., Child Support and Child Well-being: What
Have We Learned?, in CHILD SUPPORT AND CHILD WELL-BEING 1, 23 (Irwin Garfinkel
et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter Garfinkel, What Have We Learned] (calling for an assured
child support benefit—a new form of social security benefit to serve as a backup for
private support); GARFINKEL, ASSURING CHILD SUPPORT, supra note 9 (same); Laura
Bigler, A Change is Needed: The Taxation of Alimony and Child Support, 48 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 361 (2000) (calling for a deduction for child support payments); Deborah H.
Schenk, Simplification for Individual Taxpayers: Problems and Proposals, 45 TAX L.
REV. 121, 162 (1989) (arguing that all payments to ex-spouses should be treated as
alimony payments unless the parties otherwise agree to a contrary treatment); Wendy
Gerzog Shaller, On Policy Grounds, A Limited Tax Credit For Child Support and
Alimony, 11 AM. J. TAX. POL’Y 321 (1994) (calling for a limited tax credit for alimony
and child support payments); ABA Delegates Adopt Resolution to Equalize Child
Support, Alimony Treatment, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 154 (Aug. 11, 1989) (calling
for legislation to include all family support payments—including child support—in
income of payee and provide a deduction to payor).
36. See William A. Klein, Tax Effects of Nonpayment of Child Support, 45 TAX L.
REV. 259 (1990).
37. But see Shaller, supra note 35, at 321.
38. Manoj Viswanathan, Sunset Provisions In The Tax Code: A Critical Evaluation
And Presumptions For The Future, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 656, 668 (2007) (quoting
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 27-31 (5th
ed. 2005)).
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deadbeat dad dilemma, focusing on government expenditure, tax
arbitrage, 39 and the societal pressures of non-payment.
II. THE PROBLEMS OF CHILD SUPPORT
A. History of Child Support in the United States
Today, fathers make most child support payments because mothers
usually have custody of children. 40 However, this trend is rapidly
changing, as more judges are granting joint 41 and sole custody to
fathers. 42 To most people, granting custody automatically to the mother
seems natural because she is perceived as the more nurturing parent and
hence, most able to raise children. 43 This has not always been the case.
In early America, the children stayed with their father if parents
divorced. 44 Some attribute this to the prevalent culture at the time,
which by definition is a set of internalized values. 45 Thus, attributing
39. See generally Walter Adams Looney III, Essays on Tax and Social Policy (May
2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file at Harvard
University and with author) (expounding an in-depth analysis of tax arbitrage in the
family support area). Tax arbitrage is generally seen as an inefficient use of economic
resources. It is the notion of allocating resources based on tax consequences and not
based on the best economic use. Id. In the child support arena, parents exchange child
tax exemption, deductions and credits for higher child support payments.
40. See Furstenberg, supra note 15, at 196.
41. See BOUMIL & FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 89-91 (reporting that courts are
moving more toward recommending that parents share custody because this is generally
better for the child).
42. See Henry, supra note 15, at 138. A 2004 survey found that 18% of single
parents are men, an increase of 25% over the previous three years. Id.
43. BOUMIL & FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 87. There are also historical reasons
why the mother is normally assigned the role of caretaker. Fewer women were
employed outside the home and men did not generally participate in the day-to-day care
of children. Id. Now, women are firmly established in the labor force and have closed
in on the wage disparity, so their perception as caretaker has changed.
44. See Henry, supra note 15, at 138 (discussing an “early feminist meeting . . . in
1848 . . . [that] included the fact that fathers automatically received custody of children
as a principal complaint,” mostly because they needed the help of the children on the
farm); SPENCE, supra note 9, at xiv (claiming that up until the nineteenth century,
fathers were usually awarded custody of children because, since women did not work
outside the marriage, they could not afford to take care of children). The two authors
have slightly different reasons why men were allowed custody, but both reasons are
grounded on economics.
45. See THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY (revised ed. 1980) (defining
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some sociological event to culture begs the question. The answer lies in
the economics of the time. Prior to the industrial revolution, the
economy of the United States was primarily agrarian. As titular head of
the family, the father needed as much help as he could get on the farm.
As a result, society in the eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries
emphasized “the father’s centrality in raising the children and preparing
them for the adult world.” 46 As the industrial revolution progressed,
fathers tended to work outside the homestead. 47 Henceforth, the image
of the father settled into that of the “external wage-earner,” with the
mother as “home-bound nurturer,” 48 giving rise to the “cult of
motherhood” and the “tender years doctrine” of the early twentieth
century. 49
During these times, child support payment orders were rare, owing
to the fact that parents were only charged with providing a home for
their children. 50 Further, the divorce rate was extremely low due to both
the economically devastating costs of divorce and enormous social
pressure against the dissolution of marriage. 51 As we will see later,
there were also legal impediments to granting child support. 52 In the

culture as the sum total of ways of living built up by a group of human beings and
transmitted from one generation to another).
46. Henry, supra note 15, at 138.
47. See P. Lindsay Chase-Lansdale & Maris A. Vinovskis, Whose Responsibility?
An Historical Analysis of the Changing Roles of Mothers, Fathers & Society, in ESCAPE
FROM POVERTY: WHAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE FOR CHILDREN 11, 15 (P. Lindsay ChaseLansdale & Jeanne Brooks-Gunn eds., 1995) (“[T]he father remained the head of the
household and was responsible for the education and well-being of the children. In
practice, [his] direct role in family life diminished . . . as his place of work became
separated from home.”).
48. Henry, supra note 15, at 138. Other reasons have been cited for this change. In
the Puritan homes of mid-seventeenth century New England, the father was the early
educator of the children owing to church pressure and his own educational superiority
in the household. See Chase-Lansdale & Vinovskis, supra note 47, at 13. This role of
educator was transferred to the mother due to the sudden and unexpected drop in church
attendance by Puritan men. See Chase-Lansdale & Vinovskis, supra note 47, at 13.
49. Henry, supra note 15, at 138.
50. See id. at 138-39.
51. See CROWLEY, supra note 12, at 57-59. Upon marriage, all of a woman’s
assets were transferred to her husband. The early settlers also brought with them from
England “the most strictly interpreted traditional and religious ideas concerning the
sanctity of marital vows.” Id.
52. See CROWLEY, supra note 12.
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case of death of one or both parents, close relatives provided support to
the children. 53
In the early twentieth century, there was a “reorientation of welfare
policy toward children,” 54 which entailed a shift “premised on the belief
that the mother-child relationship was fundamental and sacred and that
home life should be encouraged and strengthened.” 55 Evidence also
suggests that a precursor to our current welfare system was the attempt
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to assist “poor
children in their own homes.” 56 Some states made early efforts to
criminalize the non-payment of child support. 57 In most states,
however, these new criminal laws were only enforced in cases where
destitute children were victimized. 58 More comprehensive enforcement
of the child support laws was still a few decades away.
1. Federal Government Involvement
The record of federal government’s involvement in supporting
children extends back to the end of the Civil War. It established the
Freedman’s Bureau to support the newly freed blacks and created black
schools, particularly in the South. 59 The federal government also
provided pensions for “disabled Union soldiers or their widows and
dependent children.” 60
Although the federal government spent large sums on these and
other efforts, it did not begin to gain a more central role in welfare and
child support until after the Depression with the passage of the Social
Security Act and Aid to Dependent Children Act. 61 By the 1960s, the
53. See Chase-Lansdale & Vinovskis, supra note 47, at 17 (stating that close
relatives were expected to help children in need, although increasingly indigent families
and individuals relied on private and public charity).
54. Id. at 19.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 31.
57. See id. at 20.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 18.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 22.
Aid to Dependent Children program was intended to cover all needy children in
single-mother households, states restricted assistance by insisting that children had to
live in a ‘suitable’ home. Children of African-American or never-married mothers
were particularly singled out unfairly for exclusion from the program.

Id.
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federal government assumed the central role. The father, in theory,
remained the party responsible for the well-being of his children, but
few enforcement efforts were made against him. The last twenty years
witnessed an explosion in child support enforcement spurred on, in part,
by the bi-partisan Family Support Act of 1988. 62 The Act reflected
changes in society’s views about child support and greater emphasis on
the responsibility of fathers. The greater share of responsibility was
advocated as far back as 1949 when former president Gerald Ford
introduced a bill (H.R. 4580) on that score as a congressman. 63
Importantly, the stronger penalties urged by the Act did not produce
the desired results. 64 This stems from Congress’ failure to address the
reasons for fathers’ non-compliance, which are diverse and complex.
Additionally, as this Article argues, in many cases, there is simply no
financial incentive to pay child support.
2. Greater Focus on Fathers
The bifurcation of rights and responsibilities discussed above also
made it easier for advocates to convince the public that more financial
support was needed from fathers. A popular book added fuel to the fire,
“claim[ing] that, after divorce, women’s standard of living declined by
73% while men’s standard of living increased by 42%.” 65 Despite being
wrong, and acknowledged as such by the author herself, these figures
“have been convenient for advocates and have become ingrained in both
the popular culture and academic circles.” 66
As one might expect, politics have played and continue to play a
major role in shaping child support policy. From the early 1900s to the
62. Pub. L. No. 100-485 (1988). See Chase-Lansdale & Vinovskis, supra note 47,
at 25-27. The Family Support Act was a watershed event in the child support collection
arena. It was the result of the efforts of Pres. Reagan and Sen. Daniel Patrick Monihan,
who had interest in stronger child support efforts. See Chase-Lansdale & Vinovskis,
supra note 47, at 25.
63. See CROWLEY, supra note 12, at 95.
64. Noted commentator Irwin Garfinkel wrote in 1998 that despite twenty years of
increasingly strong legislation—a time span that included the Act—child support
collections had not shown much improvement. See Garfinkel, Introduction, supra note
22, at 3.
65. Henry, supra note 15, at 140 (citing LENORE WEIZMAN, THE DIVORCE
REVOLUTION—THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN
AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985)).
66. Id.
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1960s, social workers largely shaped the child support debate. 67 “They
proposed offering mothers who received Aid to Families with
Dependent Children much more than cash assistance to support their
children . . . and direct[ed] them to all of the in-kind benefits for which
they qualified, [including] job training and educational programs.” 68 In
the 1970s, the social workers lost control in favor of conservatives, 69
who brought enforcement of child support to the forefront “with a single
focus: welfare cost recovery.” 70 As the number of female legislators
grew in the 1980s, 71 we saw a change of focus back toward the family.
Not only did strong enforcement of child support obligations for families
on welfare continue, but coverage expanded to non-welfare families. 72
In the case of non-welfare families, financial support was sent directly to
the family, instead of going through the state’s hands first. 73
Today, it is not clear who is at the helm. 74 We are seeing an
increase of advocacy on behalf of fathers, which reflects greater concern
for the father, including “forgiveness for arrears,” more equitable child
support guidelines, and “a revamping of all state award formulas to
reflect the true cost of child rearing.” 75 It appears that some states are
already responding to these concerns. 76 While it is unclear where the
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See CROWLEY, supra note 12, at 28.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 29.
See id. at 28.
Id. at 30.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW. § 12-204 (West 2007). Maryland has a
child support scheme that holds both parents responsible based on their adjusted annual
incomes. See id. at § 12-204(a). Maryland provides a table much like a tax table,
mandating a level of expected child expenditures depending on the parents’ income. See
id. at § 12-204(e). Each parent is responsible to pay an amount based on his/her
percentage of the parents’ combined income. See id. at § 12-204(a)(1). Adjustments are
made if certain child expenses are paid solely by one parent; adjustments are also made
for the amount of time the child spends in each parent’s home. See id. at § 12-204(m).
Finally, the calculation of child support is subject to court review. Even if one parent
does not work (unless physically or mentally unable to work), the Maryland scheme
assigns income to the non-working parent based on prior work history, availability of
jobs in the area, etc. See id. at § 12-204(b). An example of how the Maryland approach
works follows: Father and Mother divorce; they each make $5000 per month. They
have one child who stays with the mother full-time. Based on their combined income,
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law will eventually settle on this issue, the pendulum appears to be
swinging back to the middle.
3. The American Legal System
The American legal system has had to adjust to changes in societal
attitudes toward welfare and child support. Because there was no legal
underpinning for child support in the English system, it was said that the
American justice system had to “invent the common law notion of child
support.” 77 Apparently, “English law [only] provided . . . that all
parents should support their children, [and that] no third party—
including a mother—could attempt to collect money from her former
spouse to help her raise her children.” 78 This was in essence the concept
of joint and several liability. If both parents are responsible to support
their children, when one parent discharges their responsibility they
forfeit their right to sue for compensation.
The courts first changed their views by recognizing the right of a
third-party benefactor to sue a father 79 for necessities that the benefactor
provided to a dependent, so long as the benefactor proved that the father
failed to provide such resources. 80 The benefactor could be a relative, a
family friend, or a merchant. 81 Once this principle was laid out, it was
the expected combined amount of child support would be $1040. See id. at § 12-204(e).
They would share this amount equally—$520 each. Hence, the non-custodial father
would have to pay the custodial mother $520 per month. Based on his hypothetical
income, this is a reasonable amount. If they shared joint custody, neither would be
liable for child support payments to the other.
Thirty-three states use the Maryland or income share approach. Fourteen use a flat
percentage of the non-custodial parent’s income. Three states use what has been called
the Melson formula. Under this formula, an amount of money set at the poverty limit is
set aside from the payor’s income before child support is deducted. This way, the payor
will not dip below the poverty line due to child support obligations. SPENCE, supra note
9, at 10-13.
77. See CROWLEY, supra note 12, at 54.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 55. The early law emphasized the responsibilities of the father due to
the doctrine of coverture, under which the husband was the lord of the manor and
personified the entire marital relationship. See id. at 57. This also meant that the
husband was responsible for the financial well-being of his children. See id.
80. Id. at 55.
81. Id. An early case so providing is Van Valkinburgh v. Watson & Watson, 13
Johns. 480 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816), which involved a suit brought by a merchant to
recover the cost of a coat purchased by a child on his father’s credit. Although the
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an easy step to extend it to a former spouse. 82 Today, there is no
question that a custodial parent can sue the non-custodial parent for
failure to pay child support.
B. The Rise of the Deadbeat Dad
As the mood of the country turned in the 1970s, the emphasis
changed from helping the abandoned woman and child to making the
unsupporting father pay. A new moniker was needed because Gerald
Ford’s “runaway pappy” 83 of the 1950s would not work for the 1970s.
The proponents of stronger enforcement needed a battle cry that would
capture their frustrations. Hence, the “deadbeat dad” was born,
signaling a renewed vigor by the government to chase these men who
were avoiding their responsibilities. Use of the term was politically
effective because it instantly painted a negative picture of the noncustodial father. 84
Over the past few decades, we have been experiencing a war
against the deadbeat dad, with penalties including felony charges, nonrenewal or revocation of professional licenses, jail time, 85 and even

father was found not liable because he had been supporting his children, the case laid
the important principle that “a parent is under a natural obligation to furnish necessaries
for his infant children” and will be liable if such necessities were provided by a third
party. See id. (citing Van Valkinburgh, 13 Johns. 480).
82. See Tomkins v. Tomkins, 11 N.J. Eq. 512 (N.J. Ch. 1858). This case involved
a lawsuit brought by a mother against the estate of her ex-husband for the husband’s
failure to support their children in their prior marriage. See id. The court held that “a
parent is bound to provide his infant children with necessaries; and if he neglect[s] to do
so,” a third party could recover from the parent. Id. at 517. See also CROWLEY, supra
note 12, at 67 (discussing that the principle was not immediately applied to AfricanAmericans). Because of this, African-American fathers, for a long time, did not have to
fear enforcement of the child support laws. See id. This is partially attributed to
slavery, when the white owner was the head of household for his slaves. After slavery
ended, there was legal ambivalence as to who was the head of the household. See id.
The main reason appears to be the prejudice felt against black children—they were not
seen as “worth the bother and expense of a legal pursuit.” Id.
83. See CROWLEY, supra note 12, at 73.
84. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE
FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 14 (2005) (discussing the effective use of
labels in politics, citing as examples the pejorative use of the term “liberal” and the use
of “death tax” by opponents of the estate tax).
85. See Shaller, supra note 35, at 331 (stating that “as a significant part of his
program, Pres. Clinton [had] declared war on those who [did] not meet their child
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offers of government sponsored vasectomies. 86 Proponents of these
harsh punishments argued that the father living alone saw a drastic
improvement in his lifestyle. 87 They inflamed public outcry by
publicizing anecdotes, such as the deadbeat dad driving a MercedesBenz while his children starved. 88 As we have seen above, they also
used unreliable statistics to make their case. 89 The proponents of
stronger child support enforcement laws have been largely successful at
painting the deadbeat dad as one of “the worst type[s] of villain.” 90
Some states even have a “most wanted list” for deadbeat dads. 91
1. The Enforcement Rationale: Going After Dad
Increasing child support delinquency coincided with the rise of
modern political conservatism in American politics. Some credit former
President Gerald Ford for changing the focus of the child support debate
away from providing support to the mother and child and more toward
actively pursuing the deadbeat dad. 92 Conservatives were greatly
concerned about the increase in welfare budgets and considered the rise

support obligations”); see also BOUMIL & FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 78-80
(discussing that weapons used against the deadbeat dad include wage garnishments,
interceptions of income tax refunds, and liens on their property).
86. See Andrea W. Fancher, Thinking Outside The Box—A Constitutional Analysis
of the Option to Choose Between Jail and Procreation, 19 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L. J. 328
(2006) (discussing the constitutionality of offering defendants who are significantly
behind in their child support payments the option of going to jail or having a
vasectomy). The article concludes that under a strict constitutional analysis standard,
the vasectomy option would not pass constitutional muster; however, a lesser
standard—the reasonable standard—should be applied and under this standard, the
option would pass constitutional muster. See id. at 346.
87. See DAVID L. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY: THE ENFORCEMENT OF CHILD
SUPPORT 48-49 (1979) [hereinafter DAVID CHAMBERS] (“By separating himself from
his family and hoarding all income to himself, the father improves his standard of living
dramatically.”).
88. See OOMS & WEINREB, supra note 13, at 9.
89. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
90. William S. Comanor, Preface to WILLIAM S. COMANOR, THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS xv, xv (William S. Comanor ed., 2004)
[hereinafter Comanor, Preface].
91. See Henry, supra note 15, at 131-32 (listing a number of parents whose
professions do not provide good remuneration such as bricklayers, pipefitters,
carpenters, mechanics, taxi drivers, etc.).
92. See CROWLEY, supra note 12, at 95.
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in the number of deadbeat dads to be a direct result of the
“permissiveness” of the system. 93 They charged that Aid to Families
and Dependent Children (“AFDC”) rules simply permitted fathers to
walk away from their obligations. 94 It also did not help that by the
1970s, social workers no longer controlled the welfare and child support
agendas. 95
Conservatives are right in several respects, notably with regard to
their focus on the absentee father, but also by pointing out the link
between child poverty—welfare—and broken families. First, the parent
overwhelmingly most likely to fail to pay child support is the father. 96
The overall rate of noncompliance with child support can be more than
50%. 97 The dollar amount of this delinquency totals about $4 billion
annually and an accumulated $34 billion as of 2000. 98 Indeed,
providing federal aid to the mother and child does create a disincentive
for the father to pay, 99 though cutting aid is not called for by either side
of the aisle. Second, a correlation exists between child poverty and the
single-parent household. 100 A 1995 survey revealed that only 33.1% of
black children lived in a two-parent household, compared to 75.9% of
white children. 101 This same survey found that 16.2% of white children
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 103.
See id. at 104.
Id. at 125.
See BOUMIL & FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 108. According to a survey, up to
97% of delinquent parents are fathers. Id. There are a number of reasons why fathers
fail to make their child support payments, including inability to pay, belief that they are
paying too much, seeking revenge against their ex-spouses, and simply being
irresponsible. Id. at 109-12.
97. See Henry, supra note 15, at 140 (stating that “child support compliance was
only 44.5% where neither joint custody nor access were protected by an order”). There
is widespread unhappiness with the current child support system. For example, “a 1996
survey of Florida judges, hearing officers and special masters . . . found that one half of
those charged with ordering guideline child support thought the guidelines were unfair.
Of that half, 79% felt the guidelines treated the non-custodial parents unfairly.” Robert
A. McNeely & Cynthia A. McNeely, Hopelessly Defective: An Examination of the
Assumptions Underlying Current Child Support Guidelines, in THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS 160, 160 (William S. Comanor ed., 2004).
98. SPENCE, supra note 9, at xv; see also CAROLE CHAMBERS, supra note 3, at 17.
99. See CROWLEY, supra note 12, at 104. “AFDC rules did not require fathers to
support their children if the mother claimed ignorance concerning who or where he was.
Fathers could, thus, simply walk away from their children with impunity.” Id.
100. See TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 34, at 15-17.
101. Id. at 15.
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lived in poverty compared to 41.9% of black children. 102 To many, the
socially and fiscally responsible approach to the problem was to key in
on the fathers.
2. A Moment for Pause
What if the Mercedes-Benz stories were not true? A growing
contingent of father’s rights groups paint a pathetic figure that markedly
contrasts with the caricature of the “deadbeat dad” living the high life at
the expense of his children. These groups point to statistics indicating
that the custodial parent often has a higher standard of living than the
non-custodial parent. 103 In part, the standard of living discrepancy is
attributed to custodial parents who use solely support money for their
children without supplementing it with their own income. 104 Thus, the
counter-narrative is written, telling of pitiful fathers living in “a room
furnished in early salvation army, an unmade bed, a bare bulb, a john
down the hall, and a lonely man choking down meals of crackers and
cheese.” 105 Fathers’ advocates argue that the “deadbeat dad” is largely a
myth and that the reality is that a lot of fathers are simply “dead
broke.” 106 In short, they are claiming that the “country’s monomaniacal
102.
103.

Id. at 17.
See Comanor, Review of Current Policies, supra note 7, at 11; R. Mark Rogers
& Donald J. Bieniewicz, Child Support Guidelines: Underlying Methodologies,
Assumptions, and the Impact on Standard of Living, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS 60, 61 (William S. Comanor ed., 2004). In a 1998 study,
conducted for the Urban Institute by Laura Wheaton and Elaine Sorenson, it was found
that, in order to maintain his lifestyle after paying child support and taxes, a noncustodial parent would have to earn 50% more income in the case of one child and
100% more income in the case of two children. Henry, supra note 15, at 137.
Unreasonably high support payments also result in a “hidden alimony” for the noncustodial parent even when the custodial parent earns significantly more. See Sweat v.
Sweat, No. 2000 C 127 (Ga. Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 2002), rev’d on appeal, Ga. Dep’t of
Human Servs. v. Sweat, 276 Ga. 627, 580 S.E. 2d 206 (2003).
104. See Comanor, Review of Current Policies, supra note 7, at 20. Economist
Robert Willis suggests that an “overly generous system of child support payments
would create an incentive for divorce by the custodial mother.” Id. at 21. Thus, such
provisions may end up hurting children even though their intention was to the contrary.
Id.
105. DAVID CHAMBERS, supra note 87, at 74.
106. See Henry, supra note 15, at 137. According to a 1992 GAO report, about 66%
of deadbeat dads cannot afford to pay their child support obligations. See DAVID L.
BENDER, CHILD WELFARE: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 75 (1998). As to be expected in the
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zeal to catch and punish ‘deadbeat dads’ produced an inherently
inequitable and unjust [system],” 107 that does nothing more than “[rob]
Peter to pay Paul.” 108
3. Is There a Middle Ground?
The truth might be somewhere in the middle. Taxpayers should not
have to foot the bill for fathers who simply refuse to pay their bills. This
should not be seen as a conservative position, simply a reasonable one.
On the other hand, as we will see later, criminalizing this behavior and
spending billions of dollars has not produced the desired results. We
should, therefore, look at the reasons why responsible men become
deadbeat dads and we should not blindly follow reactionary measures.
One of the major reasons for a man to become a deadbeat dad is the
high amount of child support he is forced to pay. In some instances,
child support payments and taxes amount to 44% of the father’s
income. 109 This puts him in an untenable situation, and should he have a
second family, they too are adversely affected. 110 The father, thus, has
to choose between paying beyond his reasonable means, and not paying
at all. 111 More idiosyncratic rationales for non-payment of support
include feelings of being wronged by his previous partner, or that if by
paying child support, he tacitly acknowledges responsibility for the
failed marriage. 112 In certain situations, some men approach marriage
and child support as tantamount to a quid pro quo arrangement in which
the husband and father financially supports his wife and children in
exchange for the wife’s maintenance of the household and domestic
lower economic echelon, some fathers simply cannot afford to pay their child support
payments. BOUMIL & FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at xi.
107. CROWLEY, supra note 12, at 162.
108. Garfinkel, Introduction, supra note 22, at 4.
109. McNeely & McNeely, supra note 97, at 173.
110. See Garfinkel, Introduction, supra note 22, at 4. According to noted
commentator Irwin Garfinkel, strong enforcement of child support laws will impoverish
the father’s new family. See id. In fact, everyone will be worse off by stronger
enforcement—the father’s first family, his current family; even the government will
collect fewer taxes as the father is forced into the underground economy. See id.
111. CAROLE CHAMBERS, supra note 3, at 29. According to another commentator,
when the father has to pay more than is reasonable, his child support obligation has
“exceed[ed] his willingness to pay.” See Comanor, Review of Current Policies, supra
note 7, at 10.
112. See DAVID CHAMBERS, supra note 89, at 73.
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companionship. Once this bond is broken, the divorced man sees no
reason to continue supporting his children. 113 Still, other men withhold
support of their children to take revenge on their former spouses. 114
In sum, there are many reasons why a man could become a
deadbeat dad. We should recognize this fact and also recognize that the
war on the deadbeat dad is not working. As we will see later, casualties
of this war include the father and his children. 115 It is not idle
speculation to suggest that, without negative consequences, some men
might never pay their child support. We should, therefore, keep the
stick but also provide a carrot to the deadbeat dad.
C. The Stick Approach—Pros and Cons
Alimony payments are deductible by the payor spouse and
includible in the payee’s income. 116 The reason for the deduction grew
out of concern that the payor spouse would not be able to make these
payments due to the high rates of the federal income tax during World
War II. 117 While income tax rates have considerably decreased, 118 the
favorable tax treatment of alimony payments has remained. Regarding
child support payments, such a holistic approach has never been taken.
The non-custodial parent is seen as responsible for the economic wellbeing of his children, and this responsibility does not end when he
leaves the home. The enormity of child support delinquency, and
corresponding governmental efforts to remedy the problem, resulted in
the criminalization of the child support system. 119 This can be
considered a war on the deadbeat dad and very little incentive has been
given to encourage him to pay his child support; he is only offered a

113.
114.
115.

See id. at 74.
See BOUMIL & FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 111.
See Garfinkel, Introduction, supra note 22, at 4. One of the consequences of
the war is the disincentive for the deadbeat dad to remarry. See id. This means that the
deadbeat will not get the benefits of marriage such as greater longevity, lower alcohol
consumption and higher earnings. Id. The two-parent household may be considered the
best child support enforcement program because the resources of both parents will be
available to provide for the child. Henry, supra note 15, at 145.
116. See I.R.C. §§ 61, 215 (2000).
117. See Shaller, supra note 35, at 322 (discussing that post World War II, marginal
tax rates were as high as 91%).
118. See I.R.C. § 1 (2007) (indicating that the maximum marginal tax rate is 39.6%).
119. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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stick. The yearly costs of the OCSE are estimated at $3 billion. 120
Despite massive expense, evidence is mounting that little progress has
been made. 121 The GAO’s estimate that up to 66% of non-custodial
parents simply cannot afford to pay is an indication of why success is
slow in coming. 122
In addition to being ineffective in making the father pay, the stick
approach has other negative consequences. For very poor men, the cost
of collection is often more than what is owed. 123 Additionally, stronger
enforcement efforts force more men into the underground economy,
with the resulting loss of taxes for the government. 124 Such efforts also
discourage second marriages and take away the benefits of marriage for
men, such as decreased mortality, higher income, and lower alcohol
abuse. 125 The very purpose of stronger child support enforcement by the
federal government—that is, to increase child support payments—has
been questioned, because in actuality the government spends more
money on collection efforts than it collects. 126 In sum, stronger
enforcement efforts do not benefit children and may even leave them
worse off. 127 A contrary argument is that fathers who pay more tend to
have more contact with their children—which is a good thing. 128 The
120. See Robert I. Lerman & Elaine Sorensen, Child Support: Interactions Between
Private and Public Transfers 45 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 8199,
2001), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8199.
121. Henry, supra note 15, at 129 (questioning the effectiveness of the child support
collections system and arguing that it is not cost effective); Garfinkel, Introduction,
supra note 22, at 3 (arguing that after more than “twenty years of increasingly strong
legislation, child support collections, on average, have not shown much improvement”);
Furstenberg, supra note 15, at 196 (same); Lerman & Sorensen, supra note 120, at 16
(stating that between 1978 and 1997, the percentage of custodial mothers who received
child support increased only from 35% to 36%).
122. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
123. Irwin Garfinkel et al., Conclusion to FATHERS UNDER FIRE 331, 335 (Garfinkel
et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter Garfinkel, Conclusion].
124. Garfinkel, Introduction, supra note 22, at 4.
125. Id.
126. See Garfinkel, Conclusion, supra note 123, at 335. For fiscal year 1993,
administrative costs of the AFDC on child support collection efforts exceeded
collections by $278 million. SPENCE, supra note 9, at xv.
127. Garfinkel, Conclusion, supra note 123, at 333; Garfinkel & McLanahan, supra
note 31, at 226 (stating that some find greater enforcement leads to increased parental
conflict, which decreases the overall well-being of the child).
128. See Garfinkel & McLanahan, supra note 31, at 228; see also BOUMIL &
FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at x (stating that “a parent who is able to maintain a
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trick is to create an environment where men will be more willing to pay
their child support obligations. One way to do this is to ensure that child
support payments go to the children, as opposed to their mothers. 129
Fathers who are suspicious that some of the money does not go to the
child might be right: An estimated $1 out of every $5 of child support is
actually spent on the child. 130 Additionally, in some cases, the custodial
parent can end up having twice the spending money as the non-custodial
parent. 131 The system does not make sense because if the child is treated
as an economic good, the deadbeat dad bears the burden of paying for
the good (child support) and gets no benefit of that good (living with the
child). 132
Clearly, the deadbeat dad is wrong for refusing to pay his child
support payments. He should get no sympathy for that. Nevertheless,
we have seen that simply punishing the deadbeat dad does not work.
We need to offer an incentive to the deadbeat dad. For example, we
should permit a deduction for the payment of child support.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION
A. Review of Previous Proposals
The majority of the many proposals that address the deadbeat dad
problem state that the federal government is an essential part of the
solution. The solutions range from providing tax deductions 133 or tax
meaningful relationship with his children is simply more likely to keep up with his
financial obligations”).
129. Cf. Robert J. Willis, Child Support and the Problem of Economic Incentives, in
THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS 31, 47 (William S. Comanor
ed., 2004). A young father facing steep child support payments came up with the idea
of having a credit card system that can only be used for items the child needs. See id.
This would ensure that child support payments only went toward the needs of the child,
not the mother’s. See id. Researchers say that if the correct matching rate is chosen,
custodial mothers “will be motivated to choose an efficient level of child expenditure
that reflects [the father’s] interest in the child welfare.” Id.
130. Comanor, Preface, supra note 90, at xvi (pointing out that this is an effective
tax rate of 400%).
131. Sanford L. Braver & David Stockburger, Child Support Guidelines and Equal
Living Standards, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS 91, 93
(William S. Comanor ed., 2004).
132. Comanor, Review of Current Policies, supra note 7, at 26-27.
133. See Schenk, supra note 35, at 162 (stating that a child support payment should
be treated as alimony so it is deductible).
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credits, 134 to treating the incident of single parenthood as a covered
incident under the social security system, 135 to providing an assurance
program for children in case child support payments are not
forthcoming. 136
1. Adoption of New Social Programs
The last two aforementioned proposals do not appear feasible at this
time given the country’s aversion to new entitlements. Moreover, the
United States already has a number of programs addressing child
welfare. 137 It is not clear whether the proponents of the new programs
are advocating their programs as replacements, or simply additional
programs. Skepticism regarding such a program is well-founded as it is
tantamount to making the public foot the bill of the deadbeat dad, and
should not be done except in situations where the deadbeat dad is
incapable of making his child support payments.
2. Deduction and Credit Proposal
One proposed solution taxes the recipient on both alimony and
child support payments. 138 This proposal would allow private ordering
by treating any payments to an ex-spouse as alimony unless the parties
agree otherwise. Thus, the parties can either make the payments
nondeductible/nontaxable or deductible/includable. Currently, taxpayers
can agree to treat payments that qualify as alimony payments as non134. See Shaller, supra note 35 (describing that there should be a limited credit for
child support payments).
135. See GARFINKEL, ASSURING CHILD SUPPORT, supra note 9.
136. See Garfinkel, What Have We Learned, supra note 35, at 4 (stating a new child
support assurance system is the most comprehensive proposal for reform); Daniel
Meyer et al., Who Should be Eligible for an Assured Child Support Benefit, in CHILD
SUPPORT AND CHILD WELL-BEING 175, 176-77 (Irwin Garfinkel et al. eds., 1994)
(describing an assured benefit program that would protect eligible families against the
insecurity that comes from irregular or late child support payments).
137. See Shaller, supra note 35, at 323 n.13 (stating that alimony deduction repeals
were unsuccessful).
138. See Bigler, supra note 35, at 363 (stating that recipient’s of alimony and child
support should be taxed); Schenk, supra note 35, at 162 (stating that the author would
allow a deduction/inclusion approach unless the parties agree otherwise); see also Marci
Kelly, Calling a Spade a Club: The Failure of Matrimonial Tax Reform, 44 TAX LAW.
787, 810-11 (1991) (explaining that taxing the recipient for alimony and child support
removes the incentive for taxpayer manipulation).
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alimony payments. This option would permit taxpayers to do the
reverse. 139 Proponents assert that it would make tax arbitrage less
common in the divorce setting, soften the blow of the IRS, and simplify
the tax system. 140 The proposal has several flaws, however. First, the
private ordering would create new opportunities for the wealthy to
realize tax savings. 141 Second, the proposal fails to address the
treatment of child support payments in non-divorce cases.
The credit proposal, by creating a tax incentive for the payor of
child support, is similar to the deduction proposal. It recognizes that tax
rate manipulation would be the best way to achieve its objectives. 142
Here, child support and alimony payments received by the recipient
would be taxable even if such payments exceed the amount of credit that
can be claimed by the payor. 143 The proposed credit would be computed
at the 15% rate on the sum of alimony and child support for up to
$15,000. This would be a change from current law which imposes
almost no restriction on alimony payments so long as the definitional
requirements are satisfied. 144
The credit proposal purports to benefit all taxpayers at the same rate
without regard to the individual’s tax bracket. The full proposal also
advocates for a limited exclusion for low income recipients of child
support and alimony, or a lower income tax bracket for low income
individuals. 145 Yet, in addition to the complicated manner in which this
solution attempts to protect the low income taxpayer by placing the tax
burden on the higher income taxpayer, the major flaw in this proposal is
that it, too, fails to address the non-divorce context.

139.
140.

See Bigler, supra note 35, at 363.
See id. at 377-82 (explaining the benefits of taxing a child support and alimony
payment recipient).
141. The proposal would essentially render the rules under § 71(f) ineffective and
would create opportunities to disguise property settlements as alimony; mainly
benefiting wealthy taxpayers. Taxpayers will normally enter into private ordering or
tax arbitrage only when it benefits them economically. Those with higher income are
subject to higher tax rates and, thus, have the most to gain from tax arbitrage. See, e.g.,
Looney, supra note 39, at 6-7.
142. See Shaller, supra note 35, at 341 (stating that lowering tax rates could be the
ideal tax relief for low income individuals).
143. See id. at 337 n.85.
144. See I.R.C. § 71(a), (f) (2000).
145. See Shaller, supra note 35, at 338 (“A limited exclusion section could be
enacted for low-income recipients of child support and alimony . . . .”).
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B. A Proposal for Fair Child Support Laws
1. Setting Realistic Child Support Awards
Before changes to the federal tax code can be truly effective, state
legislatures must enact reasonable child support guidelines. This Article
examines two disparate examples—Maryland and Massachusetts—in
order to illustrate the point. Maryland’s rules are an example of sensible
child support guidelines. Massachusetts’s are not.
Under the Maryland statute, a non-custodial parent of one child
who makes $60,000 would be liable for a basic child support payment of
$520 per month if the custodial parent also makes the same income. 146
On the other hand, in Massachusetts, under similar facts, the noncustodial parent is required to pay more than twice this payment. 147 It is
no wonder that Bobby Brown could not keep up with his Massachusetts
child support payments. 148 Perhaps adding insult to injury, an expensive
child support payment often causes the custodial parent to maintain a
higher standard of living than the non-custodial parent. 149
The Maryland statute is an attempt to hold both parents liable for
the support of the child. The Maryland statute strikes a balance between
the need of the child and the ability of the non-custodial parent to pay,
with the need of the child taking center stage, as it should. 150 This is
very important because unrealistic child support awards result in
excessive payments and delinquent fathers. In addition, the statute
146. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 12-204(e) (West 2007) (summarizing
Maryland’s calculation of child support). Other factors impact this calculation,
including the amount of time the child spends with each parent. The current calculation
assumes that the child spends all of her time with the custodial parent.
147. See MASS. ANN. LAWS CONSOLIDATION OF CASES CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES,
§ III(A) (LexisNexis 2006), available at http://www.mass.gov/courts/formsandguidelin
es/csg2006.html. According to the Massachusetts guidelines, the parent would have to
pay child support in the amount of $167 plus 25% of the parent’s monthly income, for
an amount of $1217.
148. See Brown Arrested, supra note 1.
149. See Comanor, Review of Current Policies, supra note 7, at 11.
150. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 12-204(e). First, the Maryland statute
provides a table listing the amount of money both parents will be presumed to spend on
their children. This amount fluctuates with the income of the parents. As the amount of
parental income increases, the amount of child support payments rises also but not
proportionally. For example, an increase in parental income of 11.11% (from $9000
per month to $10,000) will only produce an increase of 5.5% in child support payment
(from $989 to $1040). See id.
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imposes a child support obligation on non-working parents who are
unemployed due to “voluntary impoverishment.” 151 The Maryland
statute strikes the right balance between the needs of children and the
ability of parents to pay child support. Coupled with a tax incentive to
the payor, this set of circumstances would go a long way to eliminating
the “deadbeat dad” from our lexicon.
The Massachusetts guidelines, by contrast, award child support
based upon the parent’s income. 152 This distorted focus on the needs of
children is a direct result of the “best interests of the child principle”
imbedded in family law. 153 By stipulating child support payments that
can exceed a parent’s ability to pay, the Massachusetts law and
corresponding guidelines fail to serve the best interests of the child. 154
In fact, a Georgia court specifically made such a finding regarding
excessive child support payments because the non-custodial parent was
not sufficiently able to provide for the children while in her care. 155 In
short, the percentage of income statutes shift the burden of child raising
to the non-custodial parent without taking into account the ability to pay.
151. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 12-204(b). Under the statute, if a parent is
voluntarily impoverished, child support payments are calculated based on the potential
income of that parent. A parent will be deemed to be voluntarily impoverished if the
parent is not working, unless this is due to a physical or mental disability, or the parent
is caring for a child under the age of two years, for which the parents are jointly and
severally responsible. See id.
152. MASS. ANN. LAWS CONSOLIDATION OF CASES CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES, §
III(A) (LexisNexis 2006), available at http://www.mass.gov/courts/formsandguidelin
es/csg2006.html.
153. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 1A (LexisNexis 2007).
It is hereby declared to be against the public policy of the commonwealth for a court
of competent jurisdiction to enforce an agreement between parents if enforcement of
the agreement prevents an adjustment or modification of a child support obligation
when such adjustment or modification is required to ensure that the allocation of
parental resources continues to be fair and reasonable and in the best interests of the
child.

Id. (emphasis added).
154. See CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES § III(A); see also Shaller, supra note 35.
Massachusetts is recognized as one of the states that has not struck a good balance
between the non-custodial parent’s needs and his children’s needs. The state simply
requires the non-custodial parent to pay a percentage of his income in child support.
See CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES § III(A). As a result, in states like Massachusetts “the
majority of custodial parents have higher standards of living than their matched noncustodial parents.” Comanor, Review of Current Policies, supra note 7, at 11.
155. See Sweat v. Sweat, No. 2000 C 127 (Ga. Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 2002), rev’d on
appeal, Ga. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Sweat, 276 Ga. 627, 580 S.E. 2d 206 (2003).
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Guidelines should begin with a reasonable determination of the
needs of children, followed by a determination of the economic
standing 156 of both parents, apportioning obligations based upon the
proportionate percentage of such economic standing. Ultimately,
whatever scheme a state enacts, it must be based on strict economic
analysis as required by federal mandate. 157 This economic analysis
should be premised on the notion that both parents are responsible for
the care of their children and ought to pay a proportionate share of such
costs based on their income. 158 As part of the analysis, state-enacted
guidelines should consider the large tax-related benefits that the
custodial parent receives. 159
2. Proposed Legislation on Child Support Payments
Section 71 of the I.R.C. is reproduced below to illustrate the change
in the law advanced by this Article.
Section 71—Alimony, and separate maintenance payments and
child support payments.
(a) General rule.—Gross income includes amounts received as
alimony or separate maintenance payments and child support
payments.
(b) Alimony or separate maintenance payments defined.—For
purposes of this section—
(1) In general.—The term “alimony or separate maintenance
payment” means any payment in cash if—
(A) such payment is received by (or on behalf of) a spouse
under a divorce or separation instrument,
(B) the divorce or separation instrument does not designate
such payment as a payment which is not includible in gross income
under this section and not allowable as a deduction under section 215,
(C) in the case of an individual legally separated from his
156. For this purpose, any type of economic benefit, such as receipt of a substantial
gift, should be taken into account. Basing child support payments strictly on income is,
however, a reasonable solution.
157. See 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. (2000); see also 45 C.F.R. §§ 302.55-.56.
158. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (holding that any guideline discriminating
against either parent would be found constitutionally defective).
159. Such benefits include head of household status, child exemptions, child tax
credits, child care credits, and earned income credits.
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spouse under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance, the payee
spouse and the payor spouse are not members of the same household at
the time such payment is made, and
(D) there is no liability to make any such payment for any
period after the death of the payee spouse and there is no liability to
make any payment (in cash or property) as a substitute for such
payments after the death of the payee spouse.
(2) Divorce or separation instrument.—The term “divorce or
separation instrument” means—
(A) a decree of divorce or separate maintenance or a written
instrument incident to such a decree,
(B) a written separation agreement, or
(C) a decree (not described in subparagraph (A)) requiring a
spouse to make payments for the support or maintenance of the other
spouse.
(c) Payments to support children.—
(1) In general.—Subsection (a) shall not apply to that part of any
payment which the terms of the divorce or separation instrument fix (in
terms of an amount of money or a part of the payment) as a sum which
is payable for the support of children of the payor spouse.
The term child support payment means a payment that meets
the requirements of local law. Payments that exceed the guidelines
under local law shall not be considered child support payments to
the amount of such excess. Child support payments shall be
includible in the income of the payee and deductible by the payor.
(2) Treatment of certain reductions related to contingencies
involving child.
For purposes of paragraph (1), if any amount specified in the
instrument will be reduced
(A) on the happening of a contingency specified in the
instrument relating to a child (such as attaining a specific age,
marrying, dying, leaving school, or a similar contingency), or
(B) at a time which can clearly be associated with a
contingency of a kind specified in subparagraph (A),
an amount equal to the amount of such reduction will be treated as
an amount fixed as payable for the support of children of the payor
spouse.
(3) Special rule where payment is less than amount specified in
instrument
For purposes of this subsection, if any payment is less than the
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amount specified in the instrument, then so much of such payment as
does not exceed the sum payable for support shall be considered a
payment for such support.
(d) Spouse.—For purposes of this section, the term “spouse”
includes a former spouse.
(e) Exception for joint returns.—This section and section 215 shall
not apply if the spouses make a joint return with each other.
(f) Recomputation where excess front-loading of alimony
payments—
(1) In general.—If there are excess alimony payments 160 —
* * *
Section 71 would, thus, be streamlined. The major complications
of the section—the recapture rules—would remain. Recapture rules for
child support payments are not appropriate because the danger of excess
child support payments is much less due to the longer duration of child
support payments. More importantly, the proposed language mandates
consistency with local requirements. Child support payments would
have to meet applicable guidelines, meaning that like alimony, taxpayers
would not be able to decide on an amount of child support.
Section 71(c)(2) and (3) would be excised due to the elimination of
the distinction between child support and alimony, thereby rendering the
priority given child support payments unnecessary.
While the
distinction remains important for state purposes, it would not be
appropriate for a federal statute to address this matter.
IV. OFFERING A CARROT TO THE DEADBEAT DAD: REVIEWING
THE PROPOSAL
A. Is It Time to Make Peace with the Deadbeat Dad?
The current system of penalizing deadbeat parents was born out of
frustration regarding the ineffectual policies of the 1950s and 1960s. 161
160. Section 71(f) and (g) should remain intact. The concerns with respect to excess
alimony payments are not as acute in the context of child support payments because
such payments have to meet state law guidelines. If a concern arises regarding disguise
of property settlements as child support payments, application of § 71(f) can be made to
child support payments simply by inserting “or child support payments” in § 71(f)(1).
161. See CROWLEY, supra note 12, at 29. Conservatives were worried that the
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Today we have to conclude that the penalty approach is not working
either, but it does not mean we should resort to the previous
unsuccessful approach. Rather, it is time to change the paradigm by
seeking to punish the truly deadbeat dad who refuses to pay, while at the
same time offering an incentive to the dad who wants to pay but cannot.
From an economic standpoint, the deadbeat dad has little positive
incentive to pay his child support payments. 162 Although paying child
support is morally correct, the reality is that we cannot rely solely on
morality to ensure that payments are made. Some simply do not rise to
this moral standard, whereas others justify their non-payment on wholly
separate moral grounds. 163 Hence, we need to make it economically
rewarding for the deadbeat dad to pay his debts. This is consistent with
the general approach—providing tax breaks—that we take regarding
behavior that we want to encourage. 164 This approach is also bound to
provide better success in changing the behavior of the deadbeat dad
because a positive incentive would complement the current system,
which provides only punishments for not paying one’s child support. 165
There are many potentially positive consequences for including a
carrot in this discussion. The proposals calling for tax incentives to the
deadbeat dad 166 tend to limit their discussion to the tax code. 167 There
are, however, significant non-tax goals that should be taken into
consideration. 168 For example, the qualitative impact of child support
“liberalization of welfare laws . . . was contributing to a . . . rising tendency of single
mothers to rely on welfare for financial support in lieu of private support,” namely
fathers of their children. Id.
162. Cf. Comanor, Review of Current Policies, supra note 7, at 25 (discussing a
California rule, which “requires courts to adjust [child support] awards in relation to the
amount of time spent with the child”).
163. See DAVID CHAMBERS, supra note 87, at 73 (accepting responsibility for the
divorce).
164. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 162-63 (2000) (permitting a deduction for business
expenses and certain interest payments).
165. Cf. George K. Yin et al., Improving The Delivery of Benefits to the Working
Poor: Proposals To Reform the Earned Income Tax Credit Program, 11 AM. J. TAX
POL’Y 225, 287 (1994) (discussing that to reform the Earned Income Tax Credit
program, certain incentives should be provided to employers and recognizing that
“duties mandated by law without incentives could well prove counter productive”).
166. See generally Bigler, supra note 35 (discussing the possibility of child support
payments being made tax deductible).
167. Id.
168. See Klein, supra note 36, at 260 (indicating that in determining the tax
treatment of child support payments, one must look at other issues relating to the
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payments in terms of things like the child’s earning potential and a
general sense of “well-being” far outweighs income from other
sources. 169 Allowing a deduction is also bound to increase the amount
and frequency of child support payments. 170 Research has shown that
this will positively impact children in two ways. First, this will increase
contact with their fathers because the dad who pays child support will
also visit more. 171 Second, when child support payments are made, they
are a significant source of net income to the custodial parent. 172
B. Is the Proposal Good Law?
Our income tax system is a voluntary system and will be obliterated
if taxpayers refuse to comply. 173 To the taxpayer caught in an IRS audit,
the system might not seem so voluntary, but the reality is that the system
“support of children” that would be “irrelevant to other tax disputes”); Jean T. Adams,
Reconciling Family Law With Tax Policy: Untangling The Tax Treatment of Parental
Trusts, 46 TAX L. REV. 107, 100 (1990) (examining the role trusts “play in the lives of
the family members who create and enjoy them”).
169. See William S. Comanor & Llad Phillips, Family Structure and Child Support:
What Matters for Youth Delinquency Rate?, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CHILD
SUPPORT PAYMENTS 269, 271 (William S. Comanor ed., 2004). It has been argued that
every $1 of child support payment is worth $22 of income from other sources.
Comanor & Phillips, supra at 271 (citing Sara S. McLanahan et al., Child Support
Enforcement and Child Well-Being; Greater Security or Greater Conflict?, in CHILD
SUPPORT AND CHILD WELL-BEING 239, 249-50 (Irwin Garfinkel et al. eds., 1994)). This
is because by paying child support, the child benefits by “picking up some unobserved
characteristics of the father, such as ‘family commitment’ or the fact that child support
dollars have a symbolic value that enhances children’s well-being.” McLanahan et al.,
supra, at 250.
170. Cf. I.R.C. § 215 (2000) (stating that alimony payments are deductible from the
payor’s gross income). One of the reasons we do not have a “deadbeat ex-spouse”
problem in this country is due to the deduction that the payor receives. Despite such
payments being made directly to a party with whom the payor spouse often no longer
has a positive relationship, getting a deduction for such payments make things easier. It
is also true that alimony payments are normally for a shorter duration.
171. See Lerman & Sorensen, supra note 120, at 38. Unfortunately, while the
researchers report a positive correlation between child support payments and visitation,
they also report a positive correlation between visitation and conflicts between parents.
See id. at 39.
172. See id. at 19.
173. See Reginald Mombrun, Let’s Protect Our Economy and Democracy from
Paris Hilton: The Case for Keeping the Estate Tax, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 61, 83
(2007).
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will grind to a halt if taxpayers refused to comply. To ensure
compliance, Congress has to ensure that the laws it passes are good laws
and, thus, will be respected by taxpayers. A good law must meet the
following criteria: it must be equitable, efficient and simple. 174 To be
equitable a tax must affect similarly situated taxpayers in the same
manner (horizontal equity), and disparately impact taxpayers that are not
similarly situated (vertical equity). The current system of child support
taxation is not equitable because it can cause taxpayers having the same
income to pay tax in vastly different amounts. 175 Also, savvy taxpayers
and those who have a collegial relationship with their ex-spouses or
custodial parents might be able to pay fewer taxes by engaging in tax
arbitrage. 176 The current proposal would be more equitable than the
current system because it would tax every taxpayer receiving child
support payments and would reduce or eliminate tax arbitrage with
regard to child support payments.
A good tax is also an efficient tax. An efficient tax interferes with
economic behavior minimally. Thus, “under a completely efficient
system of taxation, a taxpayer’s behavior would be identical to that of a
perfectly functioning market.” 177 The concept of efficiency is closely
related to neutrality. A neutral tax would not affect taxpayer behavior.
Some have argued that requiring that a tax be efficient is nonsensical
because society needs government to function, which requires
funding, 178 meaning that any form of taxation imposed by the
government would impact taxpayer behavior. The current proposal is
designed to affect the behavior of the deadbeat dad and is more
economically efficient than the status quo because it would cause an
increase in child support payments while taxing the party who receives
the benefit of the income.
Finally, a good tax is simple. If a tax rule is complex, it naturally
raises the costs of compliance. Complexity is generally determined
under the following three criteria: rule, compliance and transactional
174. See Viswanathan, supra note 38, at 668; see also Krisanne M. Schlachter,
Repeal of the Federal Estate and Gift Tax: Will It Happen and How Will It Affect Our
Progressive Tax System?, 19 VA. TAX. REV. 781, 792 (2000) (describing a good law as
meeting four requirements: fairness, neutrality, efficiency, and simplicity).
175. See supra Part IV.C.4.
176. Viswanathan, supra note 38, at 668.
177. Id.
178. Id. at n.79 (citing MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION 27 (5th ed. 2005)).
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complexity. 179 Rule complexity refers to the problems of understanding
and interpreting the law; compliance complexity means the difficulty in
complying with the law (forms, records etc.); and transactional
complexity relates to the expense taxpayers undergo structuring their
transaction to minimize the impact of the law. 180 The revisions to § 71
simplify the law by eliminating the different tax treatment of alimony
and child support payments. 181 The proposed rule would also cause a
decrease in transactional costs. It would make the taxation of divorce
less complex, spurning savings by taxpayers, lawyers and the court
system. 182
C. Arguments Against Deduction/Inclusion
1. The Tax Code Should Be Used Only For Economic or Fiscal
Policy Reasons
“The Rule of Law is, in the final analysis, nothing more or less than
an orderly and equitable means for achieving society’s economic,
political, social and moral objectives.” 183
Despite philosophical
disagreements respecting the use of the tax code to advance social ends,
Congress “shows little appetite for ending the use of the tax system to
enforce or encourage compliance with national objectives.”184
Moreover, every deduction and credit provided by the tax code is
arguably social engineering in furtherance of some type of direction that
179.
180.
181.

See id. at 669.
See id.
See Bigler, supra note 35, at 372-73. The current law’s complexity is reflected
by the difficulty courts have had deciding which types of payments are child support or
alimony. See id. at 372. This is because sophisticated taxpayers could disguise property
settlement as child support or alimony payments. See id. at 372-73.
182. See id. at 377-78.
183. Reginald Mombrun, The Relevance of Federal Income Tax Courses in the Law
School Curriculum and in Law Practice: Now More Than Ever, 59 THE TAX LAW 1079,
n.115 (quoting Letter from N. William Hines, President, Am. Ass’n of Law Schools,
http://www.aals.org/am2006/theme.html).
184. See Schenk, supra note 35, at 148. In addition to the tax system, Congress uses
whatever tools it has at its disposal to achieve social ends. See Stephen Barr, Congress
Weighs Using Nest Eggs as Agents of Change, WASH. POST, June 4, 2007, at D10. For
example, regarding the current genocide in Darfur, Congress is contemplating proposals
to dissuade the Thrift Savings Plan (a $210 billion retirement savings plan) from
investing in companies whose businesses in Sudan are deemed to directly or indirectly
support the genocide in Darfur. See Barr, supra, at D10.
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the government wants the country to take. 185 Many taxes, such as “sin
taxes” on tobacco and alcohol are forms of social engineering. 186 If the
power to tax is the power to destroy, then sin taxes are designed to help
destroy the sin. In short, social engineering through the tax code is
pervasive and appropriate.
The deductibility of alimony expenses under § 71 provides an
analogy to the proposed child support deduction. 187 Some argue that the
alimony deduction lacks any policy or philosophical underpinnings. 188
This might be a fair criticism because other personal expenses, such as
child support, for which there could be a more urgent policy
justification, are not deductible. 189 The reality remains that with respect
to § 71, Congress made a determination that a particular constituency
should enjoy this tax benefit. The policy justification for Congress is to
protect payees—usually women—by providing payors with incentives
to make their payments. 190 Such types of policy consideration are
routinely entertained by Congress.

185. See JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION, CASES AND MATERIALS 29 (14th ed. 2006).
186. See David J. Depippo, I’ll Take My Sin Taxes Unwrapped and Maximized, with
a Side of Inelasticity, Please, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 543, 545-49 (2002) (discussing
history of “sin taxes”). Justice Felix Frankfurter also recognized the social engineering
aspects of taxes when he stated, “[A] tax can be a means for raising revenue, or a device
for regulating conduct, or both.” See Jones v. City of Opelika, 319 U.S. 105, 134 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
187. I.R.C. § 71 (2006).
188. See Lee A. Sheppard, Safe Harbor Divorce, 33 TAX NOTES 531 (1986)
[hereinafter Sheppard, Safe Harbor Divorce] (describing § 71 as creating a safe harbor
for the conversion of property settlement into deductible alimony). Congress, in finding
the line between property settlement and alimony, rejected a two-year alimony period
because this would have allowed a payor to meet his two-year period by making a
December payment followed one month later by a January payment, resembling a
property settlement. Id. at 532. Instead, Congress chose the current three-year payment
scheme. Id.
189. See Lee A. Sheppard, Divorce In America Is Not So Simple, 23 TAX NOTES
1014, 1016 (1984) [hereinafter Sheppard, Divorce in America].
190. Cf. Shaller, supra note 35, at 323 n.13 (1994) (citing Marjorie A. O’Connell,
The Domestic Relations Tax Reform Act: How We Got It and What We Can Do About
It, 18 FAM. L.Q. 473, 494 (1985)) (stating that during the Reagan era, repeal of the
alimony deduction was briefly considered but quickly dropped due to opposition by
women’s groups, who believed that “elimination of the alimony deduction would be a
disincentive to the alimony payor”).
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The major problem with tax code social engineering is the staying
power of government taxation edicts that eventually cost the government
revenues beyond its original expectations. 191 This Article’s proposal
avoids this problem because it does not eliminate revenue, but rather
shifts the tax burden to the correct party; in this case, the taxpayer who
is also the custodial parent.
2. Shifting the Child Support Burden to Taxpayers
It is hard to quantify the costs of the proposal. Because the payor is
normally in a higher tax bracket than the payee, the government might
lose revenue on the resulting income shift. This might facilitate tax
savings to higher-income individuals, in addition to the so-called
“divorce bonus.” 192 There are fallacies inherent to this argument,
however. First, partly to the closing of the gender income gap, “the
difference between the economic status of men and women after divorce
is negligible.” 193 Second, even if gender income disparities persist, the
government’s loss is mitigated by the growing prevalence of joint
custody where child support payments are lower and increasing grants of
custody to the father. 194 Third, the government would recognize
significant savings when it becomes free of chasing the deadbeat dad. 195
Although higher income tax payers would recognize most of the tax
savings from such a program, the lower income families, who are more
likely to receive government benefits, will also benefit by the creation of
an environment where more child support payments are made, a result
sorely needed. 196
191. See Viswanathan, supra note 38, at 674-76 (stating that the home mortgage
interest deduction persists despite its ineffectiveness (as evidenced by the total revenue
lost to the deduction, which is estimated to be over $100 billion, while home ownership
has only increased from 63.4% to 68.9% over the past forty years)).
192. See Shaller, supra note 35, at 328. A divorce bonus is recognized due to the
shifting of income from a high bracket to a lower bracket. See id. Additionally, the
custodial parent also benefits by qualifying as a head of household. See id. Shaller,
however, fails to recognize that the divorced or unmarried couple does not benefit from
the economy of scale enjoyed by married couples.
193. See Bigler, supra note 35, at 386.
194. See BOUMIL & FRIEDMAN, supra note 11.
195. See Henry, supra note 15, at 128. The cost savings of the government include
amounts spent by the OCSE, in addition to enforcement costs incurred by the police and
the court system.
196. See Looney, supra note 39, at 6 (child-related tax benefits sometimes do not
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Additionally, there are already significant opportunities for
arbitrage in the current system since taxpayers can swap higher child
support payments for child deductions and credits, something that the
IRS has recognized and respected. 197 Therefore, the new proposal
would not worsen the problem. Finally, this solution will cost a lot less
than proposals that have called for adding single parenthood as a social
security benefit, 198 or devising a new “child assurance” federal
entitlement program. 199
3. The Proposal Will Create a Loophole for Wealthy Taxpayers
Supporters of this argument rely on alimony statistics that indicate a
majority of tax benefits are enjoyed by high income taxpayers. They cite
to this evidence to suggest that the public will perceive this as another
tax shelter for the rich. 200 The dissimilar tax treatment of child support

benefit poor families).
197. See, e.g., IRS form 8332, available at www.irs.gov (allowing the custodial
parent who by law is entitled to claim the child dependency exemption to release such
exemption to the non-custodial parent).
198. GARFINKEL, ASSURING CHILD SUPPORT, supra note 9, at 51.
199. Ron Haskins, Losing Ground or Moving Ahead?, in ESCAPE FROM POVERTY:
WHAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE FOR CHILDREN 241, 266 (P. Lindsay Chase-Lansdale &
Jeanne Brooks-Gunn eds., 1995). It appears that the child support assurance program
would be in addition to existing federal programs that provide help to children of the
poor. Proponents of the assurance system cite many differences from the traditional
programs, such as the fact the assurance program would not just be for the poor; it
would cover anyone entitled to receive child support. Also, unlike the AFDC, the
assurance program would not be a disincentive to work. Id. at 50. It is questionable
whether the public will have the stomach to handle what appears to be another costly
federal program, in light of the myriad of programs already available to support
children (the AFDC, the food stamp program, Medicare and Child Health, Housing
programs, school lunch programs, WIC, Headstart, tax credits, etc.), and the amount of
money spent on these programs ($131 billion in 1990 alone). See JANET M. CURRIE,
WELFARE AND WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN 1 (2001).
200. Shaller, supra note 35, at 337.
To illustrate, for 1990, although taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes of $100,000 or
greater represented only a little more than 15% of the returns claiming an alimony
deduction, the amount they deducted represented more than 36% of the alimony
deductions claimed by all taxpayers. Further, while taxpayers with incomes of
$200,000 or more represented approximately 5% of the returns claiming the alimony
deduction, they claimed approximately 20% of the total alimony deducted.

Id.
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and alimony payments is the source of many difficulties. 201 There are
significant differences between alimony and child support payments that
would make sheltering of taxes through child support payments less
likely. The opportunity for disguised property settlements is lower in
the child support area because child support installments tend to cover a
longer period of time than do alimony payments. Further, most states
stipulate the minimum support payments based on the parent’s
income, 202 making it easier to monitor abuses. Moreover, § 71(f) of the
IRC monitors excesses in alimony payments. 203 The same concepts
could be applied to child support payments. 204
4. A Deduction Will Lack Horizontal Equity
Another argument against the deduction/inclusion proposal is that
unmarried couples are favored over married couples. 205 For example, a
married couple with a yearly income of $80,000, who spends $10,000 on
their child, will not receive a deduction for such expenses aside from the
various child credits allowed by the code. 206 But, if the couple divorces
and the payor ex-spouse is allowed an overall deduction for child
support, the divorced couple would get a deduction for all child related
expenses that they could not deduct while married.
This analysis is incorrect. This proposal merely shifts income. The
couple will continue to pay income tax on their total earnings. The sole
modification is that the payee must report whatever income the payor

201. See Schenk, supra note 35, at 161-62 (describing that the differentiation
between child support and alimony has created problems regarding earned income and
child care credits); see also Bigler, supra note 35, at 337 (stating the distinction
between alimony and child support is responsible for the complexity in the current
taxation of divorce).
202. See SPENCE, supra note 9, at 10.
203. See I.R.C. § 71(f) (2000).
204. For example, one of the dangers in disguising property settlements into inflated
alimony payments is that the payee spouse might argue for alimony at a later time based
on this inflated amount. The same can be true for inflated child support payments. The
payee also takes a risk in accepting delayed property settlement payments because the
financial position of the payor could change over time.
205. Shaller, supra note 35, at 327-28 (stating that under the Revenue Act of 1969
and the progressive rate structure, divorced persons who split income under current
alimony provisions fare better than married couples).
206. Child Tax benefits include the child exemption, the child care deduction and
the child tax credit.
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can deduct. If the proposal allowed a deduction without an inclusion in
income, arguably, the divorced or unmarried couple would not be in a
better financial position than the married couple. The unmarried couple
would incur duplicate expenses, such as separate homes, telephone
services, utilities payments, car payments, insurance payments, health
insurance, and gym memberships. 207
The status quo lacks horizontal equity. 208 Currently, the noncustodial parent is the only party taxed on the income that is routed into
child support payments. Further, a taxpayer who receives child support
payment is in a better position than a taxpayer who earns the same
income but does not receive child support payments. 209 For example, a
taxpayer with a yearly income of $40,000, who does not receive child
support, will be taxed on her entire income, while another taxpayer who
makes $30,000 per year and receives $10,000 in child support payments
will only be taxed on $30,000, effectively boosting her income by
$1500—assuming they both pay a tax rate of 15%. 210
5. A Deduction/Inclusion System Would Create Hardships for Women
Some argue that one of the negative aspects of the no-fault divorce
laws is the loss of bargaining power for women. 211 There is no incentive
to negotiate prior to signing divorce papers. The only bargaining chip
for women is their control over child tax credits and deductions.212
207. Cf. I.R.C. § 1 (2000). This is the problem with the notion of the so-called
“marriage tax.” Taxing married couples at a higher rate was not horizontally
inequitable because married couples benefited from economies of scale, and, thus,
could afford to pay more in taxes. Nevertheless, the opponents of this marriage tax had
a good story, a good slogan, and were able to change the law. See id.
208. See JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE
AND POLICY 22 (2d ed. 1999) (describing the definition of horizontal equity).
209. Bigler, supra note 35, at 382 (“A taxpayer who receives payments as
excludable child support is better off than a taxpayer with the same gross taxable
income who does not receive such payments.”).
210. See id. (describing a similar scenario with two single mothers who have yearly
incomes of $60,000).
211. See ANNE CASE ET AL., NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES., UNDERSTANDING CHILD
SUPPORT TRENDS: ECONOMIC DEMOGRAPHIC AND POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 5 (2000),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8056 (stating that the switch to “no-fault”
divorce in the 1970s reduced women’s bargaining power in divorce negotiations).
212. Parents are aware of such benefits and often exchange them for higher child
support payments. If the parties have two or more children, the bargaining is simpler as
each party can split the tax benefits associated with children.
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Therefore, the current proposal will significantly decrease or even
terminate such arbitrage. Although it appears that the custodial parent
will not benefit from this system, negotiation is possible if the parties
choose to do so. 213 The custodial parent will continue to be entitled to
the various child deductions and credits currently available. More
importantly, the custodial parent has an increased chance of actually
receiving the child support due. As discussed above, taxing the recipient
would make the system horizontally equitable. 214
Finally, some argue that women will be adversely affected by this
model because they would bear the burden of taxes for child support
payments. 215 This analysis is faulty because most women 216 are not
receiving child support payments that are due, and increasing the flow of
payments offsets any potential increase in tax.
D. Arguments In Favor of the Proposal
In addition to the social benefits of the deduction/inclusion
approach discussed above, the approach would benefit the tax system.
There are three major benefits to the proposal: (1) tax simplification, (2)
incentives to pay, and (3) income being taxed to the party who has
dominion and control over the income. 217 The first benefit is based on
213. See Bigler, supra note 35, at 380.
For example, suppose that Jack and Jill are in the process of getting a divorce. Jack, if
single, would be in the 39.6% marginal rate bracket, and Jill would be in the 15%
marginal rate bracket. They are negotiating child support payments, and Jill would
like $500 per month. If the $500 were nondeductible by Jack and excludable by Jill,
then Jill’s after-tax benefit would be $500. Thus, $500 would be available for child
support. However, if the payments are deducible by Jack and includable by Jill, then
Jack should be willing to agree to, say, a $600 payment, since the after-deduction cost
of that payment would be approximately $360 ($500 x 40% = $240 deduction). Jack
is much better off under this approach. However, Jill is better off as well. The after
tax benefit to her of $600 includable payment is $510 (600 x 15% = 90; 600 – 90 =
510). In sum, $510 would be available for child support.

Id. (internal notations altered).
214. See supra Part IV.C.4 (stating that horizontal equity is a necessary component
of the tax system).
215. See Bigler, supra note 35, at 364 (“[T]axing the recipient is unfair because it
intensifies the economic hardship of women after divorce [and] is based upon empirical
evidence that has been recently disproved.”).
216. See CAROLE CHAMBERS, supra note 3, at 17 (stating 75% to 87% of children do
not receive child support payments); see also Bigler, supra note 35, at 379 (“Sixty-five
percent of absent fathers do not contribute alimony or child support.”).
217. See Bigler, supra note 35, at 376-82 (stating tax simplification, elimination of

2008

AN END TO THE DEADBEAT DAD DILEMMA

251

tax policy, the second benefit is based on public policy, and the third
benefit rests on dual policy and technical grounds.
1. Tax Simplification
The current income tax system has long been recognized as
unnecessarily complex. 218 Such complexity harms the economy because
taxpayers, their attorneys, and the court system must wrestle with
complex tax rules. 219 One of the causes of tax complication is the
differing treatment of items that should have the same treatment. If
preferential treatment is granted to one item over another, taxpayers
would naturally attempt to identify their transactions with the lower tax
option.
The distinction between child support and alimony is the cause for
much of the complexity. 220 If alimony and child support payments are
treated the same, most of § 71 definitional rules would be obsolete. 221
The current proposal provides unambiguous rules that would benefit the
tax system, taxpayers, their attorneys, and the courts. 222 In addition, the
proposal would eliminate traps for the unwary. 223 Under § 71(c)(2),
child support payments take priority over alimony payments. Thus, if a
taxpayer makes a payment that is less than the combined alimony/child
support that he owes, he has an incentive to adjust the child support
traps for the unwary, elimination of taxpayer manipulation, incentives to pay child
support, overall tax savings, payment as income to the recipient, and the application of
the assignment of income doctrine are the benefits associated with a proposal that taxes
the recipient on alimony and child support payments).
218. Id. at 372 (citing STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISION OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984
715 (Comm. Print 1984)) (“[C]omplexity in some areas may be justified because the
underlying transactions themselves are complex and the transactions are likely to be
supervised by experts. That is not [the case with] divorce.”).
219. See Bigler, supra note 35, at 378 (stating the current system has complex rules
that require extensive court interpretation).
220. See id. at 337.
221. See id. (“Treating alimony and child support the same for tax purposes
eliminates this complexity. . . . The complex definition rules of [§ 71] can be
completely disregarded.”).
222. See id. at 377-78 (stating that the simplification of the system will benefit three
main groups: taxpayers, attorneys and courts).
223. Id. at 378 (“The proposal also eliminates the traps for the unwary that plague
the current system. The exact language to differentiate the payments required by the
current system is what traps many taxpayers.”).
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portion downward and claim a higher alimony payment deduction. 224
For the payee taxpayer the reverse is true. Therefore, the government is
at the mercy of taxpayers classifying payments as alimony or as child
support. The revisions to § 71 eliminates the ambiguous code language
that instigates this problem. 225 In short, a deduction/inclusion rule
would terminate taxpayer’s manipulation of the alimony/child support
payment rules.
2. An Incentive to Pay
Providing a financial incentive in the form of a tax deduction will
encourage deadbeat dads to pay their child support obligations. 226 Yet,
it also creates an emotional incentive. The government’s refusal to
allow the father to deduct child support payments reinforces the feeling
that his contributions are meaningless. 227 If a father can deduct child
support payments, he will feel that his contributions are valuable and
necessary for his children. 228 It is easy to speculate that over time this
would increase societal pressure on men to pay their child support
obligation and create an environment where payments are consistently
made.
It should be noted that the deduction for child support rests on
stronger policy grounds than the deduction for alimony payments. 229
224.
225.

See I.R.C. § 215(a) (2000).
Bigler, supra note 35, at 378 (“[T]here will no longer be the chance that one
party will fail to report a payment (thinking it is child support) that the other party
deducts (thinking it is alimony). Both forms of payment will be includable and
deductible.”).
226. See id. at 379 (stating that providing a financial incentive may encourage
deadbeat dads to pay child support). Payors should not need an incentive to support
their own children; however, when the parents do not share the same household, the
non-custodial parent, for a myriad of reasons, needs incentives to provide long term
support to his children.
227. Id. (“By not allowing the father to deduct child support, it ‘reinforce[s] the
already existing feeling that he is no longer regarded by the state as an important part of
the child’s life, and that his contributions are meaningless.’”).
228. Id. (“The allowance of a deduction child support will allow the non-custodial
parent to feel as if his contribution is valuable. Such a simple change as allowing a tax
deduction will allow a non-custodial father to support his children without
discouragement or resentment.”).
229. See Sheppard, Divorce in America, supra note 189, at 1016 (stating that a tax
break for child support has a greater public policy justification than an alimony
deduction).
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The high income tax rates that set the stage for alimony payment
deductions have been lowered. 230 Still, the deduction persists. A
deduction for child support payments should achieve the important
policy of providing more money to custodial parents without unduly
sacrificing revenue, and might have the ancillary benefits of promoting
amicable relations between divorced couples while increasing contact
between parent and child.
3. Taxing the Right Party
Classifying child support payments as income to the recipient is
necessary. As it stands, the recipient obtains the funds tax-free and
enjoys all available child tax deductions and credits. Under assignment
of income principles, the payor and payee are “arms’ length economic
antagonists.” 231 By not recognizing this, the IRC fails to recognize the
economic implications of marriage and divorce. 232
The problem might lie in viewing child support payments as solely
a “personal, living or family expense.” 233 As tautological as it might be,
both child support and alimony payments are personal expenses because
they are not business expenses under § 162 or expenses incurred in the
production of income. 234 Moreover, neither case law, nor the legislative
histories of §§ 162, 212 and 262 adequately define “personal, living or
family expenses.” 235 Still, there are a number of code sections that
230. See Shaller, supra note 35, at 322 (explaining the history of the alimony
deduction/inclusion provisions).
231. Id. at 381 (quoting Michael Asimow, The Assault on Tax-Free Divorce:
Carryover Basis and Assignment of Income, 44 TAX L. REV. 65, 108 (1988)).
232. See Schenk, supra note 35, at 164 (stating that despite the end of the marital
relationship, the economic relationship continues and the taxation of earnings should
not change).
233. See I.R.C. § 262 (2000); Schenk, supra note 35, at 163 (stating that child
support is classified as a personal expense).
234. Schenk, supra note 35, at 163 (stating both child support and alimony expenses
are personal). There are four main approaches to determining whether an expense is a
personal expense: (1) inherently personal expense such as fees for doctor visits, (2)
excess costs (whether costs incurred by the taxpayer are job related), (3) whether
expenses can be allocated between their business and personal components, and (4)
whether an expense is primarily for business or profit-oriented activities. See BITTKER
& LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 20.2.1, available at
http://checkpoint.riag.com (last visited Sept. 19, 2007) (explaining that some business
expenses that are inherently person are non-deductible).
235. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 234, at ¶ 20.2.1 n.10 (stating that the cases,
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provide deductions for personal expenses, 236 including alimony
payments, despite the lack of any economic difference between alimony
and child support. 237 The rationale supporting the distinction is that
while the marital relationship has ended, the non-custodial parent’s
relationship with his children does not terminate. 238
Absent the drafting of a deduction via “legislative grace,” 239 there is
another way to view the income-deduction conundrum. Currently, child
support payments are not recognized as taxable income to the payee.240
In light of the provision of § 71 that excludes child support payments
from the payee’s gross income because the payor may not take a
deduction under § 215, 241 the receipt of child support should be
considered a taxable event. Once a child support payment is made, the
payor has little dominion or control over the payment. He could hope
that the money goes toward supporting his child, but this might not
always be the case. Thus, an argument can be made that, pursuant to §
61, the recipient of support payments has accession to wealth and,
therefore, income. 242
rulings, and legislative history of §§ 162, 212, and 262 fail to clarify the meaning of
personal, living, or family expenses).
236. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 213 (2000) (deduction for medical expenses), see also id. §
163 (deduction for certain interest payments).
237. Bigler, supra note 35, at 381 (“Child support and alimony should both be
treated as under the control of the recipient since there is essentially no economic
difference between child support and alimony payments.”).
238. Schenk, supra note 35, at 163 (“The Treasury Department and others have
stated that alimony is deductible because the marital relationship has terminated and,
thus, the payment is no longer personal.”); see also Louis Alan Talley, Tax Implications
of Divorce: Treatment of Alimony, Child Support and the Child’s Personal Exemption
(Cong. Res. Serv., RS 20004, Dec. 28, 1998); Bigler, supra note 35, at 382 (“One way
to view child support is as payments made to a custodial parent to help fulfill her
obligation of support to her children.”).
239. See Interstate Transit Lines v. CIR, 319 U.S. 590 (1943) (citing New Colonial
Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934)); Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493
(1940) (“[A]n income tax deduction is a matter of legislative grace . . . .”). But see
Erwin N. Griswold, An Argument Against the Doctrine That Deductions Should Be
Narrowly Construed as a Matter of Legislative Grace, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1142, 1142
(1943) (stating the strict literal construction of tax statute’s rule that favored taxpayers
was not rational).
240. See I.R.C. § 71(c) (2000).
241. See id. §§ 71, 215.
242. See Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (defining
income as “undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the
taxpayers have complete dominion”). To date, § 61 does not contain specific language
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V. CONCLUSION
The deadbeat dad phenomenon causes both short-term and longterm social and economic problems. In the short term, it is one of the
causes of childhood poverty. In the long term, it denies economic
opportunities to children and deprives them of developing a bond with
their fathers. As argued above, a strong bond with parents is greatly
beneficial to children. As a society, we have advanced from ignoring
the problem to attacking it, and neither approach has worked. There are
numerous reasons for this failure.
We are faced with a quandary that we must resolve. It is time for a
new approach. This new approach is the offering of a carrot to the
deadbeat dad. Along with the stick that we adopted in the 1980s, it is
our best hope to erase the deadbeat dad from our lexicon.
In this Article, I have argued that the current governmental
approach to addressing the deadbeat dad problem is simply not working
because the problem is worsening. The Article has provided ample
evidence of this worsening situation. There are many reasons why a dad
would refuse to pay his child support obligations, but the root cause of
the problem is that the typical deadbeat dad feels that he has gotten the
raw end of the deal. That is, he is bearing the economic burden of childrearing while getting few of the benefits (i.e., actively participating in
child-rearing). Although some may argue that this feeling is not wellgrounded and is only a perception, as far as the deadbeat dad is
concerned, this is reality. If we want to change the current situation, we
must change the perception of the deadbeat dad.
This Article provides a three-prong approach to solving the
problem: (1) set realistic child support payments, (2) provide a
deduction for the payor of child support payments (payee will take
payment into income), and (3) retain the penalties for failing to pay child
support. The purpose of the first two prongs of this approach is to create
incentives for the deadbeat dad to pay his child support obligations
because, often, he does not pay because he cannot afford to pay. Setting
realistic child support payments would go a long way to addressing
ability to pay. States such as Maryland have adopted a shared income
model where both parents are responsible for the support of their
children. In addition to making payments by the non-custodial parent
more affordable, such an approach is also seen as more equitable as it
regarding income treatment for child support payments. See I.R.C. § 61 (2000).

256

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF
CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

Vol. XIII

puts the burden on both parents. Coupled with the added deduction
incentive, my proposal would create an environment where there will be
little excuse for not paying child support obligations and, thus, societal
pressure on the deadbeat dad to pay his obligations will increase. The
proposal recognizes that the proposed incentives will not work in all
cases; hence, the current penalties for failing to pay child support
obligations must be retained.
To be sure, some will particularly oppose the second part of this
proposal on many grounds but, as argued in this paper, the benefits of
the deduction/inclusion approach outweigh its costs. A particularly
potent argument against the deduction/inclusion approach is that it will
hurt mothers because the tax burden will be shifted to them. This
argument, however, fails to note that mothers that need the support
payments, but do not receive them, will see an economic benefit by
receiving regular payments regardless of the potential tax liability. A
by-product of increased child support payments will be increased
visitations by dad and increased psychological benefits for the children.
Finally, this Article provides proposed language to § 71 that would
result in simplification of the section and easier administration by the
IRS. This proposed language should be embraced by tax simplification
advocates. Tax simplification would be achieved by the proposed
changes giving similar treatment to both alimony and child support
payments. Hence, § 71(c)(2) would be entirely eliminated because the
concern of disguising child support payments as alimony payments
would no longer exist. Moreover, child support payment would be
defined according to state law with the result that the complicated rules
under § 71(f) to guard against disguising non-deductible property
settlements as deductible alimony payments would not spill over to the
child support area, since state law zealously patrols the definition of
child support.

